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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the eect of heterogeneity of link weight, heterogene-
ity of the frequency or amount of interactions among individuals, on the evolu-
tion of cooperation. Based on an analysis of the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma
game on a weighted one-dimensional lattice network with intra-individual het-
erogeneity, we conrm that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity can fa-
cilitate cooperation. Furthermore, we identify two key mechanisms by which
link-weight heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation: mechanisms
for spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derive the corresponding
conditions under which the mechanisms can work through evolutionary dynam-
ics.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, Prisoner's dilemma, Heterogeneity of
link weight, One-dimensional lattice network, Game theory
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation, which plays a key role in natural and social
systems, has attracted much interest in diverse academic elds, including bi-
ology, sociology, and economics [1, 2]. The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is often
used to study the evolution of cooperation in a population consisting of selsh5
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individuals [3, 4]. In the PD game, two individuals simultaneously decide to
cooperate or defect. A payo matrix of the PD game is given in Table 1.
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation R, R S, T
Defection T , S P , P
Table 1: Payo matrix for the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. In this game, two individuals
decide simultaneously to cooperate or defect. Mutual cooperation provides them both with
a payo R, whereas mutual defection results in a payo P . If one individual cooperates and
the other defects, the former obtains a payo T , and the latter a payo S. These values are
assumed to satisfy the conditions T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T .
If either individual wishes to maximize his/her personal prot in this game,
he/she will choose to defect regardless of the opponent's decision, despite mutual
cooperation being better than mutual defection for both individuals. According10
to the evolutionary dynamics of the PD game where an individual is paired with
a randomly chosen opponent in a well-mixed population, cooperators become
extinct whereas defectors eventually dominate in the population [5].
However, in a dilemma situation in the real world, we often see that altruistic
behaviors exist among unrelated individuals. Nowak [6] proposed ve rules as15
the mechanisms enabling the evolution of altruism: kin selection [7], direct
reciprocity [4, 8], indirect reciprocity [9, 10], network reciprocity [11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19], and group selection [20].
In this study, we focus on network reciprocity, which is a mechanism pio-
neered by Nowak and May [11, 12] that enables the evolution of cooperation20
when each individual is likely to interact repeatedly with a xed subset of the
population only. In Nowak and May's model, individuals are placed on nodes in
a two-dimensional lattice and play the PD game repeatedly with their directly
connected neighbors only. The authors show that the spatial constraint of in-
teractions among individuals in the lattice network can facilitate the evolution25
of cooperation. Although Nowak and May's model assumes that the popula-
tion has a simple network structure, that is, a two-dimensional lattice, it has
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recently been shown that many real-world networks are identied as complex
networks. Well-known examples of complex networks are the small-world net-
work [21] and the scale-free network [22], in which the number of links (degree)30
that each individual has diers. Recently, it has been conrmed by Santos and
Pacheco [13] that heterogeneity of the number of links in complex networks can
enhance the evolution of cooperation. There have been following studies that
investigate the evolution of cooperation on networks with heterogeneous number
of links [14, 15]. This heterogeneity is also known to contribute to the eciency35
of collective action [23, 24]. Additionally, it has been shown that the mixing
pattern of link degree can aect the emergence of cooperation [16]. See [17, 18]
for detailed reviews of evolutionary and coevolutionary games on graphs. Also
see [19] for a thorough survey of the evolutionary dynamics of group interactions
on various types of structured populations.40
The aforementioned studies, however, assume that individuals interact with
one another with the same frequency or amount; that is, all the link weights
between individuals in the society are identical. On the contrary, individu-
als in real-world networks, such as scientic collaboration networks, phone call
networks, email networks, and airport transportation networks, have heteroge-45
neous intentions in their relationships [25, 26, 27]. There is substantial interest
among researchers in knowing how heterogeneity of the strength of relationships
(that is, link weight) among individuals inuences human behavioral traits (e.g.
sociological studies such as [28, 29, 30]).
In particular, researchers have recently investigated whether the heterogene-50
ity of link weight between individuals promotes the evolution of cooperation.
For example, Du et al. [31] constructed a simulation model in which individuals
are placed on a node in a scale-free network and connected to other individu-
als with heterogeneous link weights. In their model, individuals interact more
frequently with neighbors connected by links with large weights and less fre-55
quently with those connected by links with small weights. Du et al. found that
cooperative behavior can be more facilitated when the link weights shared by
individuals are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. Note that, in their
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model, interaction networks have two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneity of
the number of links and that of link weight. Note also that each link weight is60
determined according to the number of links of individuals; that is, link weight
is a function of the degrees of the two individuals at either side of the focal
link. Therefore, in the Du et al. model it is dicult to ascertain which factor
enhances cooperation: heterogeneity of the number of links or heterogeneity of
link weight.65
Additionally, Ma et al. [32] employed a two-dimensional square lattice with
individuals placed on its nodes. In their model, individuals play the PD game
with their immediate neighbors connected by links with heterogeneous link
weights. Ma et al. arranged three populations, where the link weights in
the population follow either power-law, exponential, or uniform distribution70
patterns. They conrmed that a network with a power-law distribution of link
weights better facilitates the evolution of cooperation than one with link weights
conforming to one of the other two probability distributions.
Because a two-dimensional square lattice is used in their model, each indi-
vidual has the same number of links (i.e., four). Thus, their result clearly shows75
that heterogeneity of link weight can bring about a cooperative state even with-
out heterogeneity of the number of links. However, in their model, the sum
of link weights of an individual, which we call the link-weight amount of the
individual, diers from those of others. That is, not only each of the links pos-
sessed by an individual can have a dierent weight, but the individual can also80
have a dierent link-weight amount from other individuals. We call the former
intra-individual heterogeneity and the latter inter-individual heterogeneity.
When inter-individual heterogeneity exists, some individuals play the PD
game more frequently than others (link-weight amount is heterogeneous among
individuals). That is, there is heterogeneity of the interactions among individ-85
uals. It has already been shown [13, 14, 15] that heterogeneity of interactions
among individuals due to heterogeneity of the number of links among individ-
uals and not to inter-individual heterogeneity can facilitate the evolution of
cooperation.
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Fig. 1: Examples of a one-dimensional lattice with three kinds of heterogeneity: (a) inter-
individual heterogeneity, (b) heterogeneity of the number of links, and (c) intra-individual
heterogeneity. Thick and thin lines between individuals denote links with large and small
weights, respectively.
Fig. 1 shows three examples of a one-dimensional lattice having, respectively,90
intra-individual heterogeneity, inter-individual heterogeneity, and heterogeneity
of the number of links. Fig. 1(a) shows an example of inter-individual hetero-
geneity, where individuals on the left-hand side have large link-weight amounts
and those on the right-hand side have small link-weight amounts. In this case,
individuals on the left-hand side interact more frequently with others than those95
on the right-hand side; that is, there is heterogeneity of interactions between
individuals. Heterogeneity of the number of links is shown in Fig. 1(b), where
individuals on the left-hand side have a large number of links and thus more
opportunity to interact than those on the right-hand side. Both inter-individual
heterogeneity and heterogeneity of the number of links bring about a similar type100
of heterogeneity of interactions among individuals in the sense that either can
cause link-weight amount heterogeneity. Finally, Fig. 1(c) shows an example
of intra-individual heterogeneity, where each individual has both a large-weight
link and a small-weight link, but all individuals have an equivalent link-weight
amount. That is, intra-individual heterogeneity does not involve the hetero-105
geneity of the link-weight amount among individuals but involves the hetero-
geneity of the weight of links of each individual. Thus, it should be noted that
intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-individual heterogeneity are essentially
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dierent types of heterogeneity.
The literature [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,110
48] has investigated the eect of heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation
from variety of viewpoints 1. Especially, Du et al. [31] and Ma et al. [32] have
clearly shown, as mentioned in the above, that the existence of link-weight het-
erogeneity facilitates the evolution of cooperation. However, we cannot reject
the possibility that the evolution of cooperation in the models of Du et al. and115
Ma et al. might be facilitated by the eect of link-weight amount heterogene-
ity, whose eect on the evolution of cooperation has already been conrmed by
Santos and Pacheco [13]. This is because the link-weight heterogeneity in their
models involves not only intra-individual heterogeneity but also inter-individual
heterogeneity. Whether heterogeneity of link weight without heterogeneity of120
link-weight amount, intra-individual heterogeneity alone, can promote the evo-
lution of cooperation or not is the remaining question to be solved. Detailed
investigation of this question would enable us to understand the underlying
mechanism of the evolution of cooperation caused by the heterogeneity of inter-
actions among individuals.125
To answer this question, we introduce the simplest possible model of a
weighted network, with intra-individual heterogeneity and without inter-individual
heterogeneity. First, we employ a weighted one-dimensional lattice as the sim-
plest network model and investigate the eect of link-weight heterogeneity on
the enhancement of cooperation. Second, we examine when and how such het-130
erogeneous link weight gives rise to the evolution of cooperation; that is, we in-
vestigate the mechanism by which heterogeneity enables cooperation to evolve.
1For example, Cao et al. [35] focused on the dynamics (change over time) of the magnitude
of the link-weight heterogeneity. Chen and Perc [38] examined the eect of the heterogeneity
in incentives for rewarding individuals in the public goods game on promoting cooperation.
Szolnoki et al. [41], Perc and Szolnoki [42], and Santos et al. [43] examined diversity of individ-
uals. Perc [44] introduced the random variations to the payo of individuals and invetigated
the eect of it on the evolution of cooperation. Brede [47] and Tanimoto [48] analyzed the
bias in game partner selection.
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Specically, we identify the conditions under which link-weight heterogeneity
enables society to become cooperative, through analytical calculation and com-
puter simulation.135
2. The model
In this study, we develop a model of a spatial evolutionary game with link-
weight heterogeneity based both on the PD cellular automaton model proposed
by Nowak and May [11, 12] and the weighted network model employed by Du
et al. [31, 33], Ma et al. [32], Buesser [34], and so on. We construct a lattice140
network model in which each individual occupies one node and is connected to
his/her neighbors by links with heterogeneous weights. Each individual has two
links, one shared by the individual to his/her left and one to his/her right. We
assume periodic boundary conditions for the network we employ.
There are two types of heterogeneity of link weight in a network: (i) intra-145
individual heterogeneity : the heterogeneity of link weight between the links of an
individual; that is, an individual can have a large-weight link with one neighbor
and a small-weight link with another; and (ii) inter-individual heterogeneity : the
heterogeneity of link weight between individuals; that is, an individual can have
many large-weight links whereas another can have many small-weight links. In150
this research, we focus on the former type of heterogeneity to begin our investi-
gation on the eect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation
using the simplest form of heterogeneity.
Because we consider a network with intra-individual heterogeneity only (i.e.,
without inter-individual heterogeneity), the sums of the link weights of all the155
individuals are roughly equivalent. Let the weight of a link (large-weight link)
of an individual be w1 and the weight of the other link (small-weight link)
be w2 (w1 > w2 > 0). Because we assume that there is no inter-individual
heterogeneity (the sum of w1 and w2 is the same for all individuals) and that an
individual's right (left) link is shared by the right (left) neighbor, all individuals160
have a link with weight w1 and one with weight w2.
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Hereafter, we assume a large link weight to be w1 = 1:0 + w and a small
weight to be w2 = 1:0   w to express w1 and w2 using only one parameter,
w 2 [0; 1]. The larger the value of w, the more heterogeneous the link weight
becomes. When w = 0, link weight in the lattice network is completely homo-165
geneous.
To investigate the evolution of cooperation in weighted networks, we consider
the situation where each individual i plays the PD game with his/her immediate
neighbors in a weighted lattice network as described above. We assume an
individual i has a strategy si =fC;Dg that determines whether to cooperate170
with or defect from all of his/her neighbors. That is, each individual can either
be a cooperator who always cooperates with all his/her opponents or a defector
who always defects. According to the literature [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 31, 32, 33, 35, 41, 42, 47], we rescale the game to be drawn using a single
parameter. For the PD game, we let T = b, R = 1, and P = S = 0 2 to rescale175
the payo matrix using one parameter b. This parameter represents the payo
of a defector when exploiting a cooperator, and is constrained by the interval
1:0 < b < 2:0. In each generation, all pairs of connected individuals play the
PD game. After playing the game, each individual obtains the payo multiplied
by the value of the weight of the link with his/her opponent. The weight of180
the link between individuals i and j is dened as wij , and the payo of an
individual i with strategy si, when playing with an individual j with strategy
sj , is represented as sisj . The total payo an individual i receives is expressed
as i =
P
j2Vi sisjwij , where Vi is the set of neighbors of individual i. In the
rst generation, each individual's strategy, which is either to cooperate or to185
defect, is randomly determined with a 50 percent probability. We dene the
score of each individual in a generation as the sum of the payos received from
2As Nowak and May [11] noted, simulation results are typically not aected by whether
the payo matrix involves P = S or P > S, thus, we assume P = S in our study. This
assumption enables the payo matrix to be expressed and controlled only by one parameter
b.
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all the games with his/her neighbors.
After all individuals have played the PD game with all their neighbors, each
individual imitates the strategy of the individual with the maximum score190
among all his/her neighbors including him/herself. An individual does not
change his/her strategy if he/she is one of those with the maximum score. If an
individual has more than one neighbor, excluding him/herself, with the max-
imum score, he/she chooses one of them randomly. Individuals update their
strategies simultaneously, after which one generation is completed.195
For the evolutionary simulation, we set the network size N=10,000 and set
b (the temptation to defect from a cooperator) such that b 2 (1:0; 2:0) in steps
of 0.01. We assume that w 2 [0; 1:0] in steps of 0.01, and therefore, 1:0 + w
denotes a large weight (strong link) and 1:0  w corresponds to a small weight
(weak link).200
3. Simulation results and discussion
To examine how heterogeneity of link weight aects the evolution of cooper-
ation, we analyzed how the degree of link-weight heterogeneity, w, aected the
resulting frequency of cooperation in the population. The frequency of coopera-
tion in each generation was calculated as the ratio of the number of cooperators205
to the total population size. We dened the frequency for a simulation run
as the average of the frequency of cooperation over 100 generations after the
2,000th generation. We adopted this denition because, although we wished to
estimate the frequency at the convergent state, we found that this state some-
times did not converge to a xed state but went to a periodic state. (We checked210
that the frequency of cooperation could reach a steady or periodic state within
2,000 generations.) We performed 100 runs of the computer simulation for each
parameter setting and calculated the average of the frequency of cooperation
for all the runs 3, which hereafter, we refer to as the frequency of cooperation.
3For each parameter setting, all individuals followed the payo matrix in which parameter
b had an identical value and the value of link-weight parameter w was the same for all links.
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3.1. Overview of the eect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of co-215
operation
Figs. 2(a) and (b) illustrate the simulation results for the PD game on a
weighted one-dimensional lattice and show the frequency of cooperation for dif-
ferent values of link-weight heterogeneity, w. As shown in these gures, changes
in the frequency of cooperation with an increase in w dier in the case of a small220
b = 1:2 (Fig. 2(a)) and that of a large b = 1:8 (Fig. 2(b)).
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Fig. 2: Frequency of cooperation for dierent values of link-weight heterogeneity, w, in a
weighted one-dimensional lattice: (a) case with a small b (b=1.2) and (b) case with a large
b (b=1.8). The horizontal and vertical axes represent the degree of w, which reects the
magnitude of the heterogeneity of link weight and frequency of cooperation, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), the frequency of cooperation when the link weight is
heterogeneous (w > 0) is always greater than that in the case of homogeneous
weight (w = 0). Fig. 2(b) shows that the frequency of cooperation when the
link weight is heterogeneous is smaller than that in the case of homogeneous225
weight. If the value of w increases further, however, the magnitude of coop-
erative behavior in the case of heterogeneous weight is greatly enhanced and
exceeds that in the case of homogeneous weight. In both cases (a) and (b), the
cooperation frequency reaches the maximum at some value of w(> 0) (when
there is some degree of link-weight heterogeneity). Both of these gures show230
that the frequency of cooperation does not change with an increase in w until w
reaches a certain threshold; that is, the change in the frequency is not gradual,
but stepwise with an increase in w. As shown in Figs. 2(a) and (b), there are two
thresholds for w, Threshold A and Threshold B, at which the value of coopera-
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tion frequency jumps up or down. These thresholds are w = (b  1:0)=(b+ 1:0)235
and w = 2:0=b  1:0, the derivations of which are provided later.
We have shown that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity (intra-
individual heterogeneity) can enhance cooperation and that there are some
thresholds in w (a parameter that represents the degree of heterogeneity) at
which the cooperation frequency changes in a stepwise manner. We checked240
that these results are robust against both the dierence of the network size and
the existence of the decision error. (See Appendix A of Iwata and Akiyama
(2015) [49] for detail.)
3.2. Analysis of small population case | When and how does the heterogeneity
of link weight facilitate cooperation?245
In the following, we explore why the heterogeneity of link weight brings about
the evolution of cooperation and why the frequency of cooperation changes in
a stepwise manner with an increase in link-weight heterogeneity w. To answer
these questions, we consider a much simpler model composed of six individu-
als only, and investigate in detail how the heterogeneity of link weight aects250
evolutionary dynamics.
In the case of a lattice network with six individuals, possible congurations
of the strategies chosen by the six individuals are: \ CC CC CC ,"
\ CC CC CD ," \ CC CC DC ," ..., \ DD DD DD ,"
where \C" and \D" denote cooperator and defector, respectively, \" represents255
a link with a large weight 1:0+w, and \ " indicates a link with a small weight
1:0  w. The total number of possible congurations is 26=64.
Starting with each of the 64 initial congurations, we investigated how the
conguration changed over time resulting from updates of the six individu-
als' strategies and identied the attractors of the evolutionary dynamics of the260
strategy congurations over generations, which were either steady states or pe-
riodic cycles. Next, we estimated the cooperation frequency in the attractor of
evolutionary dynamics by taking an average of the data derived from the last
100 generations. In each of the 64 case studies, we focused on initial strategy
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congurations that reached dierent cooperative states depending on the value265
of link-weight heterogeneity w. Next, we classied these congurations into
three types: Type (i): congurations that lead to a higher cooperation level
when w > 0 than that with a homogeneous link weight (w = 0). Type (ii):
congurations that lead to a lower cooperation level when w > 0. Type (iii):
congurations leading to the same level of cooperation. (See Appendix A for270
the classication of the initial strategy congurations into these three types.)
Because we are interested in cases where the heterogeneity of link weight has
an eect on the evolution of cooperation, in the following, we focus on strategy
congurations of the rst and second types.
There are six strategy congurations that belong to Type (i) (see Appendix275
A), which shows that higher heterogeneity (large w) causes an increase in coop-
eration frequency. These six congurations have a common pattern, as shown
in Figs. 3(a) and (b). Similarly, there are three strategy congurations that be-
long to Type (ii), where the magnitude of cooperation frequency decreases with
higher heterogeneity. These three congurations have a common conguration280
pattern as shown in Fig. 4.
First, we consider the evolutionary dynamics, starting from the strategy con-
guration pattern in Figs. 3(a) and (b). Here, we focus on the third individual
from the left in each of both gures, who we simply call the focal individual.
When starting from the strategy conguration pattern shown in these gures,285
the focal individual chooses cooperation in the next step for a large w. For
a small w, however, the focal individual does not change his/her strategy and
keeps the strategy of defection. In short, this conguration pattern enables the
spread of cooperation if heterogeneity of link weight exists. We now investigate
in detail why this spread of cooperation occurs.290
Figs. 3(a) and (b) show the strategy conguration patterns for Type (i),
where the heterogeneous link weight (w > 0) achieves a higher cooperation fre-
quency than the homogeneous one (w = 0). Of the 64 strategy congurations,
there are six congurations where greater link-weight heterogeneity enables a
higher cooperation level: \ CC DD CC ," \ DD CC CC ,"295
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Fig. 3: Strategy conguration patterns for type (i), where heterogeneous link weight (w > 0)
achieves higher cooperation frequency than the homogeneous one (w = 0). \C" and \D"
denote cooperator and defector, respectively, \" represents a large-weight link, and \ "
indicates a small-weight link. Whether the strategy of the focal individual changes from
defection to cooperation depends on the value of link-weight heterogeneity w. The change
in strategy of the focal individual after one generation (interactions and strategy updates) is
indicated by the arrow in the lower part of each gure.
\ CC CC DD ," \ CC DD DD ," \ DD DD CC ,"
and \ DD CC DD ." Considering the periodic boundary condition,
the rst three congurations are equivalent to \ CC DD CC ," which
is shown at the top of Fig. 3(a). Similarly, the latter three congurations are
equivalent to \ CC DD DD ," which is shown at the top of Fig. 3(b).300
We dene two cooperators connected by a large-weight link as \CC cluster,"
two defectors connected by a large-weight link as \DD cluster," and one coop-
erator and one defector connected strongly as \CD cluster" or \DC cluster."
When \CC cluster," \DD cluster," and \CC or DD cluster" are adjacent
as shown in Figs. 3(a) and (b), there is the possibility that the focal individual305
(the third individual) updates his/her strategy from defection to cooperation
depending on the value of w (link-weight heterogeneity). We call this congu-
ration pattern the spread pattern strategy conguration.
Given that there exists a spread pattern strategy conguration, we investigate
the actual conditions under which the focal individual (the third individual)310
updates his/her strategy from defection to cooperation. Because each individual
obtains the payo of the PD gamemultiplied by the value of the weight of the link
with his/her opponent and each individual's score is the sum of all the payos
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obtained by playing PD games with his/her neighbors, the score of the third
individual is b(1:0   w). The fourth individual obtains a score of b(1:0   w) if315
the fth individual is a cooperator (see Fig. 3(a)), else 0 if the fth is a defector
(see Fig. 3(b)). Thus, in either case, the score of the focal individual (the third
individual) is greater than or equal to that of the fourth individual. Because
the focal individual is assumed to imitate the strategy of the individual with the
maximum score, it is sucient for the focal individual to compare his/her score320
with that of the second individual to ascertain whose strategy to imitate. The
focal individual imitates the second individual's strategy and changes his/her
strategy from defection to cooperation only if the second individual's score is
higher than the focal individual's own score. Because the score of the focal
individual is b(1:0 w) and that of the second individual is 1:0+w, the condition325
under which the focal individual imitates the strategy of the second individual
is 1:0 + w > b(1:0  w); that is, w > (b  1:0)=(b+ 1:0) for a given b.
Thus, if the population involves the spread pattern strategy conguration
composed of three adjoining clusters, namely, \CC cluster," \DD cluster,"
and \CC or DD cluster," whether the focal individual changes his/her strat-330
egy from defection to cooperation depends on the link-weight heterogeneity;
that is, he/she becomes a cooperator if the link weight satises the condition
w > (b  1:0)=(b+1:0). We refer to the inequality of w mentioned above as the
condition for the spread of cooperation. To summarize, if this condition is sat-
ised in the spread pattern strategy conguration, cooperative behavior spreads335
from the second to the third individual.
Next, we look at the evolutionary dynamics starting from the strategy con-
guration pattern in Fig. 4. As in the case of Figs. 3(a) and (b), we focus on
the third individual from the left in this gure and call him/her the focal indi-
vidual. When starting from the strategy conguration pattern shown in Fig. 4,340
the focal individual chooses defection in the next step for suciently large val-
ues of w. For a small w, however, the focal individual does not change his/her
strategy and retains a cooperative state. In short, this conguration pattern en-
ables maintenance of cooperation when the heterogeneity is not so large. In the
14
following, we investigate in detail why this maintenance of cooperation occurs.345
Fig. 4: Strategy conguration pattern for type (ii), where heterogeneous link weight (w > 0)
reduces cooperation frequency more than homogeneous link weight (w = 0). Here, \C" and
\D" denote cooperator and defector, respectively, \" represents a large-weight link, and
\ " indicates a small-weight link. Whether the focal individual changes his/her strategy
from cooperation to defection is dependent on the value of link-weight heterogeneity w. A
change in the strategy of the focal individual after one generation (including interactions and
strategy updates) is depicted by the arrow in the lower part of the gure.
Fig. 4 shows the strategy conguration pattern in the case of Type (ii), where
homogeneous link weight (w = 0) achieves higher cooperation frequency than
heterogeneous weight (w > 0). Of the 64 strategy congurations, there are
three congurations where a small heterogeneity promotes further cooperation:
\ CC CD DC ," \ CD DC CC ," and \ DC CC CD ."350
Considering the periodic boundary condition, these congurations are equiva-
lent to \ CC CD DC ," as shown at the top of Fig. 4. When \CC
cluster," \CD cluster," and \DC cluster" are adjacent, as shown in this g-
ure, there is a possibility that the focal individual (third individual) updates
his/her strategy from cooperation to defection depending on the value of w355
(link-weight heterogeneity). We call this conguration pattern the maintenance
pattern strategy conguration.
Given that there exists a maintenance pattern strategy conguration, we
investigate the condition under which the focal individual (third individual)
does not update his/her strategy from cooperation to defection and retains the360
strategy of cooperation. In this case, the focal individual (third individual) has
a score of 1:0   w, the second has a score of 2:0, and the fourth has a score
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of b(1:0 + w). So the focal individual does not imitate the fourth individual's
strategy (defection) but imitates the second individual's strategy (cooperation),
only if 2:0 > b(1:0 + w); that is, w < 2:0=b  1:0 for a given b.365
Therefore, if the population is subject to a maintenance pattern strategy con-
guration composed of three adjoining clusters, namely, \CC cluster," \CD
cluster," and \DC cluster," whether the focal individual can refrain from
changing his/her strategy from cooperation to defection depends on link-weight
heterogeneity; that is, he/she remains a cooperator if the heterogeneity w sat-370
ises the condition w < 2:0=b   1:0. We call the inequality of w given above
the condition for maintenance of cooperation. If this condition is satised in the
maintenance pattern strategy conguration, defective behavior does not spread
from the fourth to the third individual. Otherwise, defection spreads.
Thus far, we have derived the condition for the spread of cooperation w >375
(b 1:0)=(b+1:0)4 and that for the maintenance of cooperation w < 2:0=b 1:0 for
one individual in a small population. These obtained conditions are illustrated
in Fig. 5.
The parameter space for the temptation payo, b, and link-weight hetero-
geneity, w, is divided into four regions, namely, region I, where both conditions380
are satised, region II, where only the spread condition is satised, region III
where only the maintenance condition is satised, and region IV where neither
condition is satised.
4In fact, the condition w > (b   1:0)=(b + 1:0) is not only the spread condition of coop-
eration but also is the maintenance condition, under which cooperator avoids from changing
his/her strategy to defection; that is, cooperation can be maintained. However, this fact does
not change our results in which the intermediate level of the magnitude of heterogeneity can
enhance cooperation and that heterogeneity has several thresholds at which cooperation fre-
quency changes in a stepwise manner. Thus, we omit the fact that w > (b   1:0)=(b + 1:0)
involves both spread and maintenance conditions in this paper.
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Fig. 5: Two conditions under which link-weight heterogeneity enables the spread/maintenance
of cooperation in a small population. These conditions are determined and illustrated here
using a combination of link-weight heterogeneity w and payo b. The horizontal and vertical
axes represent the payo b and the value of w.
3.3. Simulation analysis on a large population
The two conditions identied in the previous subsection are based on the385
analysis of a small population (six nodes); nevertheless, whether these two con-
ditions can control the spread/maintenance of the frequency of cooperation in a
large population as well, remains to be seen. As mentioned, Figs. 2(a) and (b)
depict the simulation results for a large (10,000 node) one-dimensional lattice
showing how link-weight heterogeneity w aects the frequency of cooperation.390
By comparing Figs. 2(a) and (b) with Fig. 5, we can see whether the condition
for the spread of cooperation w > (b   1:0)=(b + 1:0) and that for the main-
tenance of cooperation w < 2:0=b   1:0 identied in the small population, also
hold in a large population.
For example, when b = 1:2, the phase shifts in Fig. 5 through regions III395
(maintenance condition holds), I (both conditions hold), and II (spread condi-
tion holds), as parameter w increases. After an increase in w, it will be on the
boundary between regions III and I where w = (b   1:0)=(b + 1:0) holds. As
mentioned, in Fig. 2(a), if w has a value satisfying w = (b 1:0)=(b+1:0), w is at
Threshold A, at which point the cooperation frequency increases in a stepwise400
manner. If the value of w satises (b  1:0)=(b+1:0) < w < 2:0=b  1:0, cooper-
ation frequency is at its highest value in Fig. 2(a), and when b = 1:2, (w; b) is in
region I in Fig. 5. Thereafter, if the value of w is equal to w = 2:0=b  1:0, w is
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at Threshold B at which point the cooperation frequency starts to decrease in
a stepwise manner in Fig. 2(a), and (w; b) is located at the boundary between405
regions I and II in Fig. 5. Similarly, also in the case where b = 1:8, the phase
shifts in Fig. 5 through regions as an increase in the value of w correspond to
the changes in the cooperation frequency seen in Fig. 2(b).
We have found that the two conditions identied in the small group can
explain the eect of link-weight heterogeneity on the level of cooperation fre-410
quency in a large population. However, so far we have conrmed this only in
the cases with b = 1:2 and b = 1:8. Next, we examine the possibility of an
application of the two obtained conditions for w to an increase or decrease in
the cooperation frequency in a stepwise manner for several thresholds of w over
the whole parameter range of b 2 (1:0; 2:0) (in steps of 0.01).415
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Fig. 6: Simulation results for the PD game showing the relationship between the frequency of
cooperation and b w parameter combination. The horizontal and vertical axes denote temp-
tation payo b and link-weight heterogeneity w. Here, color coding represents the magnitude
of the frequency of cooperation, as shown on the sidebar. We denote the region with the high-
est cooperation frequency (red) as region I', that with the second highest frequency (orange)
as region II', that with the third highest (green) as region III', and the lowest frequency region
(blue) as region IV'.
Fig. 6 illustrates the frequency of cooperation for dierent values of the
combination of b and w. If the combination of b and w denotes a point that is
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located in region I (both conditions hold) in Fig. 5, the same point is placed in
region I' in Fig. 6, at which point the cooperation frequency has its highest value.
In addition, if the combination of b and w denotes a point that is located in420
region II (spread condition holds) in Fig. 5, the same point is placed in region II'
in Fig. 6 and the magnitude of the cooperation frequency is the second highest.
It is observed that the two lines w = (b   1:0)=(b + 1:0) and w = 2:0=b   1:0
in Fig. 5 coincide with the lines dividing the parameter space into four regions
(region I', II', III", and IV') in Fig. 6. This coincidence implies that the two425
conditions for link-weight heterogeneity w identied in the small population also
hold for the spread/maintenance of cooperation in the large population across
the entire parameter range of b.
4. Conclusion
Much research has been conducted to analyze the factors that promote the430
evolution of cooperation in natural and social systems. Recently, several re-
searchers [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] have
examined the eect of heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation. Especially,
Du et al. [31] and Ma et al. [32] have claried that link-weight heterogeneity can
facilitate cooperation. However, they investigated heterogeneity of interactions435
among individuals, which includes both intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-
individual heterogeneity, to the best of our knowledge. Inter-individual hetero-
geneity leads to heterogeneity of the link-weight amount, which causes hetero-
geneous interactions similar to those caused by the heterogeneity of the number
of links, and the eect of the heterogeneity of the number of links on the pro-440
motion of cooperation has already been established in the literature [13, 14, 15].
Therefore, the eect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of coopera-
tion may be given only by inter-individual heterogeneity whose eect is similar
to that of the heterogeneity of the number of links. To investigate whether link-
weight heterogeneity within each individual alone can promote cooperation, it is445
necessary to use a model with intra-individual heterogeneity and without inter-
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individual heterogeneity. Additionally, it has not been fully resolved when and
how promotion of cooperation based on the heterogeneity of link weight takes
place.
To address these issues, we constructed a simple model of one-dimensional450
lattice with heterogeneous link weight, on which individuals play the evolution-
ary PD game. We assumed that the sum of the link weights of each individual
was equal, to remove the eect of inter-individual heterogeneity on the promo-
tion of cooperation, thereby focusing only on intra-individual heterogeneity.
By performing calculations and analyses, we obtained the following two re-455
sults. First, we claried that the moderate magnitude of intra-individual het-
erogeneity of link weight can facilitate cooperation and that there are some
thresholds in the range of the heterogeneity level, at which the change in the
cooperation frequency occurs in a stepwise manner. This result suggests that,
even when there is no heterogeneity of link-weight amount that causes a sim-460
ilar eect to that of heterogeneity of the number of links as in Santos and
Pacheco [13], heterogeneous link weight within each individual alone can pro-
mote cooperation. Second, we found the key mechanisms whereby link-weight
heterogeneity facilitates the evolution of cooperation, the mechanisms for the
spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derived corresponding condi-465
tions for the both mechanisms to work through evolutionary dynamics, which
have not been claried before.
Because the simulation model used is very simple, it may appear to be some-
what unrealistic. However, this simplicity enabled us to examine the eect of
heterogeneous link weight (intra-individual heterogeneity) and the aforemen-470
tioned mechanisms. We believe that our discovery of these mechanisms can
form the basis of future researches on link-weight heterogeneity. It would be
interesting to investigate the eect of heterogeneity of link weight on the evo-
lution of cooperation and its mechanism using a mathematical model with a
more realistic assumption. For example, to extend the network structure from475
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a one-dimensional lattice to a two-dimensional one 5, or so-called complex net-
works such as small-world and scale-free networks, would be attractive matter
to be worked on as a future work. Another interesting avenue for future research
would be to identify the mechanisms by which link-weight heterogeneity that
includes both intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-individual heterogeneity,480
such as link-weight heterogeneity in the real world, promotes cooperation. Al-
though we found in this paper the mechanism by which intra-individual het-
erogeneity alone can facilitate cooperation, there may be a specic mechanism
for the evolution of cooperation caused by the interplay between intra- and
inter-individual heterogeneities.485
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Appendix A. Classication of strategy congurations
In this appendix, we show the classication of the initial strategy congura-
tions for a convergent state of cooperation frequency in a small one-dimensional595
lattice consisting of six individuals. Of the 26=64 initial strategy congurations,
we focus on those congurations that, through evolution, reach dierent coop-
erative states depending on whether the link weight is heterogeneous (w > 0) or
homogeneous (w = 0) as a result of the evolution of strategies. As mentioned
in Section 3.2, the initial strategy congurations are classied into the follow-600
ing three types: Type (i) in which heterogeneous link weight (w > 0) leads to
higher cooperation frequency than the homogeneous one (w = 0); Type (ii) in
which heterogeneous weight suppresses cooperation; and Type (iii) where both
heterogeneous and homogeneous link weights lead to the same magnitude of
cooperation. The initial strategy conguration types are listed in Table A.16.605
6Six strategy congurations are classied as both Type (i) and (ii), where, whether the
heterogeneous link weight (w > 0) achieves a higher cooperation frequency through evolution
than the homogeneous weight (w = 0) depends on the value of b. Our purpose was to identify
the mechanisms whereby link-weight heterogeneity enhances cooperation and to derive the
conditions for the mechanisms to work. Therefore, we investigated the strategy congurations
classied only as Type (i) or (ii).
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Initial strategy conguration Classication type
 CC DD CC ,  DD CC CC , Type (i): Heterogeneous link
 CC CC DD ,  CC DD DD , weight (w > 0) promotes
 DD DD CC ,  DD CC DD  further cooperation
 CC CD DC ,  CD DC CC , Type (ii): Homogeneous link
 DC CC CD  weight (w = 0) promotes
further cooperation
 CC CC CC ,  CC CD CD , Type (iii): Heterogeneous
 CC DC DC ,  CC DC CD , weight (w > 0) and
 CD CC DC ,  CD CD CC , homogeneous weight
 CD CD DC ,  CD CC CD , (w = 0) achieve the
 CD CD CD ,  CD CD DD , same level of cooperation
 CD DC DC ,  CD DD DC ,
 CD DC CD ,  CD DC DD ,
 CD DD CD ,  CD DD DD ,
 DC CC DC ,  DC CD CC ,
 DC CD CD ,  DC CD DC ,
 DC CD DD ,  DC DC CC ,
 DC DC DC ,  DC DC CD ,
 DC DC DD ,  DC DD CD ,
 DC DD DC ,  DC DD DD ,
 DD CD CD ,  DD CD DC ,
 DD CD DD ,  DD DC DC ,
 DD DD DC ,  DD DC CD ,
 DD DC DD ,  DD DD CD ,
 DD DD DD 
Table A.1: List of initial strategy congurations and classication thereof into three types.
The rst row represents the initial strategy congurations; the second row shows the three
classications of the congurations in which greater link-weight heterogeneity w promotes
more cooperation, higher w reduces cooperation frequency, and dierent values of w do not
have any eect on the magnitude of the cooperation level, respectively. In the table, \C"
and \D" denote cooperator and defector, respectively, while \" indicates a link with a large
weight, and \ " means a link with a small weight.
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